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THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW BY CANADIAN COURTS*
JOHN CLAYDON**
There has been much publicity in Canada recently about the
Lovelace case,' which involved a claim by a Canadian Indian wo-
man to an international organization to obtain, in effect, the rever-
sal of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Attorney-Gen-
eral of Canada v. Lavell.2 In Lavell the Court upheld a section of
the Indian Act stipulating loss of official Indian status for an In-
dian woman who marries a non-Indian, although the same depriva-
tion does not apply to Indian men who marry non-Indians. 3 The
Supreme Court reached its decision by a restrictive interpretation
of the contents of the Canadian Bill of Rights,4 particularly the
guarantee of "equality before the law" in section 1(b), and by giv-
ing the Bill a limited effect in Canadian law. Two years or so after
the Lavell decision, Canada adhered to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and to its Optional Protocol,5 which
permits individuals to petition the Human Rights Committee. San-
dra Lovelace took her case to the Committee in 1977. More than
three years later, after much correspondence, the Committee ex-
pressed "its views" to the petitioner and the Canadian govern-
ment, determining that Canada had violated article 27 of the Cove-
nant.8 However, the Committee's "decision" did not bind the
* This Article is a revised and expanded version of a paper delivered at the annual
conference of the Canadian Council on International Law in Ottawa in October, 1981.
** Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. I am indebted to my col-
league Allan Manson for bringing to my attention many of the criminal law cases referred to
in this Article.
1. Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DR (XIII) (1981) (Communication
No.R.6/24).
2. 38 D.L.R.3d 481 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1973).
3. One important consequence of deprivation of official Indian status, suffered by both
Lavell and Lovelace, is denial of the entitlement to live on a reserve.
4. CAN. REV. STAT. App. III 457 (1970).
5. 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (entered into force March
23, 1976).
6. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DR (XIII), at 8-10.
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government. 7 Lavell is still the law in Canada.
The point of recounting the stories of Lavell and Lovelace is
not to deny the value of the Covenant and its Optional Protocol as
important milestones in the international protection of human
rights. Rather it is to demonstrate how even the most promising
international measures for remedying human rights violations can
be procedurally weak, particularly in terms of such factors as ease
of access and ultimate effectiveness, when compared with the do-
mestic remedies available in the legal system of a mature and dem-
ocratic state such as Canada. On the other hand, as these cases
also show, the *substantive international human rights standards
binding on such a state may be more extensive than the rights
guaranteed by its domestic law.8 Clearly human rights in Canada
would be enhanced in the aggregate if the more extensive interna-
tional standards could be coupled with the more effective imple-
mentation procedures available in the domestic legal system.
The purpose of this Article is to explore this linkage by ana-
lyzing the processes for integrating international human rights law
into the Canadian legal system. The focus is on the legal effect
accorded by Canadian courts to the two major traditional sources
of international law: custom and treaties. Virtually all treaties en-
tered into by Canada, including human rights treaties, are non-
self-executing and therefore require implementing legislation in or-
der to have a controlling effect in domestic law.9 Since no general
human rights treaty ratified by Canada has been implemented, is-
sues concerning the relevance of the treaty to the interpretation of
implementing legislation are not discussed.' 0 Emphasis is rather on
the status in Canadian law of ratified but unimplemented treaties.
Norms emanating from international intergovernmental agencies
7. One observer has written that "The Protocol is not a strong instrument by any stan-
dard." Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L.S.L.
REV. 31, 44 (1978).
8. See Fischer, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AND CANADIAN LAW, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT'L
L. 42 (1977). In April, 1982 Canada adopted a constitutional Charter of Rights and Free-
doms (The Constitution Act 1982, §§ 1-34). While this Charter will correct the substantive
imbalance significantly, the built-in capacity enabling both Parliament and the provincial
legislatures to enact legislation to override many of the Charter's provisions (Id. at § 33)
could conceivably nullify much of the progress.
9. See notes 38 & 39 infra.
10. See generally on this issue A. JACoMY-MiLLETTE, TREATY LAW IN CANADA (1975);
Rigaldies & Woehrling, Le juge interne Canadien et le droit international, 21 CAHIERS DE
Dnorr 293, 313-28 (1980).
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and embodied in such instruments as codes of conduct and resolu-
tions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Coun-
cil, derive authoritative status either from custom or because they
are ultimately treaty-based, or even simultaneously through both
modalities." Some of these latter norms are of uncertain interna-
tional legal status and may be described as "soft" law.
One of the themes of this Article is that there is a discernible
trend, particularly in recent Canadian judicial application of inter-
national human rights law, toward the undifferentiated application
of "hard" and "soft" law. This development will be described in
the context of a general survey of the use made by Canadian
judges of customary law, ratified but unimplemented treaties, and
the decisions of international intergovernmental agencies for three
distinct purposes: 1) to determine the outcome of a case directly
by serving as the relevant decisional law; 2) to remedy gaps and
ambiguities by supplementing domestic rules; 3) to overturn a rule
otherwise enforceable by a domestic court.
I. THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY
CANADIAN COURTS
A. Customary International Law
The conceptual foundations for the adoption and evolution of
customary international law in Canadian domestic law are suffi-
ciently permissive to provide the developing customary human
rights law with a promising direct point of entry. Although the
courts have not been too scrupulous about elaborating the theoret-
ical basis for applying custom, they accord it much the same status
as the common law. 2 The basic practice has been summarized as
follows: "customary rules of international law are adopted auto-
matically into our law.. . and then directly applied unless they
conflict with statute or some fundamental constitutional principle.
). If there is a conflict because a previous customary rule
11. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a resolution of the Gen-
eral Assembly (G.A. Res.217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)), has been described as an
authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter
and as customary international law. See C. SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTrru-
TIONS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS 54-57 (1981).
12. See Buvot v. Barbuit, 25 E.R. 777 (1737).
13. Macdonald, The Relationship between International Law and Domestic Law in
Canada, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 88, 111 (Mac-
1981] 729
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adopted by the courts has been replaced by a later rule-a real
possibility in the human rights area in view of the newness of the
law-it can be persuasively argued that the new rule is the only
relevant one, for the old rule no longer exists." The basis for such
an evolutionary view of the place of custom in domestic law has
been well articulated by Rand, J. in the Armed Forces case, where
the essential adaptability of the common law was stressed in the
context of changes in international law and of the international re-
sponsibility of Canadian courts: "To insist upon precise precedent
in usage would sterilize judicial action toward changing interna-
tional relations." 15
While it is clear that federal statutory law takes precedence
over custom, 6 there is uncertainty about whether provincial legis-
lation has similar effect. The preponderant view among constitu-
tional commentators is that, apart from a few limited exceptions
not encompassing violations of international law, the provincial
legislatures possess competence under the distribution of powers
effected by. the Constitution-the British North America
Act 7-that is as plenary as that accorded to Parliament. If this
donald, Morris & Johnston eds. 1974).
14. This argument has been advanced most forcefully by Lord Denning in the context
of the movement of the international law of sovereign immunity toward a restrictive view
that denies immunity to a foreign government when it is engaged in commercial activities.
See Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529 (C.A.). For Cana-
dian decisions adopting a similar approach, see Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo,
5 D.L.R.3d 128 (Que. Ct. App. 1968); Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Venne, 22
D.L.R.3d 669, 681 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1972) (Laskin, J., dissenting); Penthouse Studios v. Re-
public of Venezuela, 8 D.L.R.3d 686 (Que. Ct. App. 1969); Zodiac International Prod., Inc. v.
Polish Peoples Republic, 81 D.L.R.3d 656 (Que. Ct. App. 1977). Professor Duffy has noted
that there are at least two possible interpretations of Trendtex: "On the 'narrow' view, the
Trendtex exception to stare decisis is confined to precedents whose rationes rest on now
obsolete customary international law ... By contrast, on the 'wide' view the Trendtex
exception means that changes in customary international law are incorporated into the com-
mon law and override any inconsistent precedent whether the ratio of the earlier decision
rested on the application of now obsolete customary international law or not." Duffy, En-
glish Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L & COeip. L.Q. 585, 601
(1980). Obviously the role of customary human rights law would be much more significant
under the "wide" interpretation.
15. [1943] Can. S. Ct. 484, 524.
16. See Re Foreign Legations, [1943] Can. S. Ct. 208, 213-14; Armed Forces Reference,
[1943] Can. S. Ct. 484, 517-18. For a recent application, see Gordon v. R., [1980] 5 W.W.R.
668 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
17. British North America Act, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 (1867, as am.), CAN. REv. STAT.
App. II 191 (1970) [hereinafter cited as B.N.A. Act]. The legislative powers of the federal
Parliament are enumerated in § 91 (id. at 214) and those of the provincial legislatures in
730 [Vol. 30
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position is valid, the provinces could determine to a significant ex-
tent the domestic fate of customary international human rights
law, since many matters affecting human rights are within provin-
cial jurisdiction.1 8 The opposing viewpoint has been advanced co-
gently by Judge Laforest,19 who argues for provincial incompetence
by stressing the contemporary application to the provinces of the
rationale for the doctrine of extraterritoriality: subordinate legisla-
tures were not permitted, under the British Imperial system, to
legislate extraterritorially, because if they did so in violation of in-
ternational law this could embarrass the Imperial Parliament in
London.20 It should also be emphasized that every matter that in
the world of 1867 had a foreign affairs element was allocated in the
B.N.A. Act to Parliament instead of the provinces.21
Acceptance of the position that the provinces are constitution-
ally barred from violating customary international law, while the
federal government is not, threatens neither their autonomy nor
their capacity to function in an increasingly interdependent world.
Because the federal government is bound by international custom-
ary law whether it likes it or not, it cannot use its legislative juris-
diction with impunity as a pretext for undermining provincial
8 92 (id. at 216).
18. This result arises particularly from the effect of the British North America Act, 30
& 31 Victoria, c.3 § 92 (13), CAN. RaV. STAT. App. 1 216 (1970)--"Property and Civil Rights
in the Province"-which establishes provincial competence to proscribe (or tolerate) dis-
crimination in such areas as employment and accomodation. Also, recent Supreme Court of
Canada decisions have upheld provincial legislation imposing film censorship and restricting
freedom of assembly. See Re Nova Scotia Board of Censors & McNeil, 84 D.L.R.3d 1 (Sup.
Ct. Can. 1981); Attorney-General of Canada v. Dupond, 84 D.L.R.3d 420 (Sup. Ct. Can.
1978).
19. LaForest, May the Provinces Legislate in Violation of International Law?, 39 CAN.
BAR REV. 78 (1961).
20. Id. at 81-87. By § 3 of the Statute of Westminister 1931 (CAN. REv. STAT. App. 11
401 (1970)), a constitutional document, the Parliament of Canada was granted the power to
enact laws having extraterritorial operation; no such power has been granted to the
provinces.
21. See especially British North America Act, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3 §§ 91(2)-The Reg-
ulation of Trade and Commerce, 91(7)-Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence,
91(10)-Navigation and Shipping, 91(12)-Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries, 91(25)-Natu-
ralization and Aliens, and 91(27)-Criminal Law (CAN. REv. STAT. App. H 215-16 (1970)).
The only reference to treaties in the B.N.A. Act-§ 132 (id. at 227)-stipulates that federal
authorities have the power to perform "the obligations of Canada or of any Province
thereof, as Part of the British Empire, towards Foreign Countries, arising under Treaties
between the Empire and such Foreign Countries." With Canada's accession to indepen-
dence, § 132 has become obsolete. See Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of
Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326, 349 (P.C.).
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power domestically: international law circumscribes the scope of
the federal power. On the interdependence point, it is not neces-
sary to go as far as the Supreme Court went in the Offshore Min-
eral Rights case in stipulating that federal ownership of rights in
the territorial sea and continental shelf off British Columbia flow
inexorably from the world community's recognition that these
rights and responsibilities inhere in Canada.22 It would be suffi-
cient to recognize a federal residual right of intervention triggered
by actual or likely provincial infringement of customary interna-
tional law, along the lines of the currently existing operation of the
federal emergency power.2 3
The issue of the capacity of the provinces to violate customary
international law, potentially very important for the integration of
international human rights law, has not been finally resolved by
Canadian courts. The fact that it rarely arises as an issue before
the courts is probably attributable in part to both the acceptance
by Canadian lawyers of conventional constitutional wisdom and
the lack of opportunity, until recent times, for the provinces to
come into conflict with international law. A rare exception, signifi-
cantly involving human rights, is a recent decision of the Alberta
Court of Queen's Bench.2 4 A union sought to have provisions of the
Alberta Public Service Employees Relations Act, which prohibits
civil servants from striking, declared unconstitutional as in conflict
with customary international law. Chief Justice Sinclair surveyed a
wide range of possible sources of customary international law, in-
cluding the International Labour Organization Conventions and
Reports, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Be-
cause he concluded as a matter of interpretation that these instru-
ments do not guarantee civil servants the right to strike, no
22. Reference re Offshore Mineral Rights, [1967] Can. S. Ct. 792.
23. The emergency power permits Parliament to invade provincial jurisdiction during
crisis situations. See, for judicial consideration of its most recent and controversial applica-
tion, in a situation of alleged economic crisis, Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, 68 D.L.R.3d
452 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1976).
For a general discussion of the capacity of provinces to violate custom and a suggestion
that custom should be accorded the status of federal law along the lines of the German
solution, see Rigaldes & Woehrling, supra note 10, at 311-13.
24. Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v. R., 81 Can. Lab. Law Rep. 12,435 (Alta.
Q.B. 1981). For a comment on this decision, see Bendel, The International Protection of
Trade Union Rights: A Canadian Case Study, 13 OTr. L. REV. 169 (1981).
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determination was made as to the competence of a province to leg-
islate in violation of international law.2" However, the decision is
significant for the seriousness with which the judge and lawyers for
the government treated the international law arguments advanced
by the union. Their receptive attitude is a welcome departure from
some previous, more cavalier responses to efforts to integrate inter-
national human rights law.
28
Although there have been few instances of direct application
of customary international human rights law by Canadian courts,
there is certainly no theoretical barrier to its integration. While the
status as custom of some of the instruments referred to by Chief
Justice Sinclair might be questionable, the volume of law in this
area is increasing rapidly. A particularly fruitful source is the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, many provisions of which can
be categorized as custom by virtue of the "juridical consensus"
that has developed through countless invocations in practice and
in other General Assembly Resolutions, through its inclusion in
numerous post-war constitutions, and by its use in decisions of the
International Court of Justice.27 Recently American courts have
done much to emphasize the authority of the Declaration and of
customary human rights law in general.
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated that the prohibition of torture "has
become part of customary international law, as evidenced and de-
fined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ' 28 Although
Filartiga was complicated by the existence of an enabling statute,
the Alien Tort Claims Act, which could be viewed as specifically
incorporating international law by granting jurisdiction to district
25. Nor was any serious inquiry made about the status of these instruments as custom.
26. In Dowhopoluk v. Martin, 23 D.L.R.3d 42 (Ont. H. Ct. 1971), Addy, J., commented
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "was never ratified by the Canadian Parlia-
ment (nor was it formally ratified by any of the other countries concerned)." Since the Uni-
versal Declaration is not a treaty, it was never open for ratification.
27. See Humphrey, supra note 7, at 33. In its recent decision in the American Hostages
case, the International Court stated that "[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their
freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself
manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as
with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. Rep. 3, para. 91. For a
more general reference to customary international human rights law, see Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light & Power Co., [1970] LC.J. Rep. 4, pares. 30 & 34.
28. 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
1981] 733
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courts in actions "by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations of a treaty of the United States,"2 the
decision clearly established torture to be a violation of "the law of
nations."8 0
In Fernandez v. Wilkinson 3 1 a case not encumbered by the
existence of any incorporating law, the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas also cited the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in concluding that "even though the indeter-
minate detention of an excluded alien cannot be said to violate the
United States Constitution or our statutory laws, it is judicially re-
mediable as a violation of international law."'32 Significantly, the
court considered that the Universal Declaration "has evolved into
an important source of international human rights law."88
These recent developments in Canadian and American judicial
activity also indicate that while it may be possible to rely on the
Universal Declaration as a source of customary human rights law,
the Declaration is only one component, albeit an important one, of
that law. In all three cases referred to-Filartiga, Fernandez, and
the Alberta, Union decision-the courts adopted a cumulative ap-
proach, using treaties, U.N. Declarations, and authoritative reports
to complement the Universal Declaration in establishing custom.5 '
In Filartiga and Fernandez reference was even made to a treaty
which the United States can neither sign nor ratify.3 5 The role of
treaties as components of custom demonstrates clearly the interre-
lationship between these two primary sources of international law.
Treaties, however, can also have independent, direct domestic
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
30. 630 F.2d at 884. The court also emphasized the role of the Universal Declaration in
specifying "with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter." 630
F.2d at 883. This linkage, coupled with the description of the Universal Declaration as "evi-
dence" of customary law, renders the court's determination of the Declaration's precise sta-
tus ambiguous.
31. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), af'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
32. Id. at 798.
33. Id. at 797.
34. See text & accompanying note 24 supra for a discussion of the Alberta Union case.
In both Filartiga and Fernandez reference was made to the signed but unratified Interna.
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and American Convention on Human Rights.
See respectively 630 F.2d at 883-84 and 505 F. Supp. at 797. In Filartiga the court also cited
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Punishment, 630 F.2d at 882-83.
35. 630 F.2d at 884; 505 F. Supp. at 797. The European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
[Vol. 30
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force which in turn can be linked to custom, as in the case of the
treaty basis of the Universal Declaration. 6
B. Treaties
In Canada the making of an international agreement is within
the power of the federal executive," but its direct incorporation in
domestic law usually requires legislative action. If the subject
matter of the treaty lies within the executive powers, then it can be
enforced by the executive without legislation. If not, as in the case
of most treaty-based international human rights norms, there can
be no controlling domestic incorporation in the absence of legisla-
tion enacted by either Parliament or the provincial legislatures, de-
pending on the subject-matter of the treaty.3 9 One commentator
has identified the constitutional rationale for the non-self-execut-
ing status of treaties in the Canadian system to be the theory "that
,the executive not be permitted to escape parliamentary control by
doing by treaty what it could not otherwise do alone. 4 0
Although the double-barrelled requirement of legislation fol-
lowing the ordinary federal-provincial division of legislative com-
36. See notes 11 & 30 supra.
37. The capacity to bind Canada internationally through the conclusion of a treaty is a
'"prerogative" or historical power of the executive. See P. HOGG, CONSMrUTxONAL LAW OF
CANADA 181-84 (1977).
38. The scope of executive and legislative powers in the direct treaty incorporation area
has been summarized well by Rand, J.:
Speaking generally, provisions that give recognition to incidents of sovereignty
or deal with matters in exclusively sovereign aspects, do not require legislative
confirmation. For example, the recognition of independence, the establishment
of boundaries and, in a treaty of peace, the transfer of sovereignty over property,
are deemed executed and the treaty becomes the muniment or evidence of the
political or propriety title....
Except as to diplomatic status and certain immunities and to belligerent rights,
treaty provisions affecting matters within the scope of municipal law, that is,
which purport the change existing law or restrict the future action of the Legis-
lature, including, under our Constitution, the participation of the Crown, and in
the absence of a constitutional provision declaring the treaty itself to be law of
the state, as in the United States, must be supplemented by statutory action.
Francis v. Queen, 3 D.L.R.2d 641, 647 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1956).
39. Attorney-General of Canada v. Attorney-General of Ontario, [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
By mirroring the constitutional division of powers in domestic cases, Canadian law regard-
ing authority to implement treaties is far removed in spirit from the centralist implementing
power established for the United States by Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
40. Macdonald, International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of Canada, 2 DAL. L.
J. 307, 316 (1975).
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petence has, at least in the absence of any legislation, severely cur-
tailed the potential for invoking human rights treaties before
Canadian courts as direct sources of law, there exist some situa-
tions in which a case for direct incorporation of ratified but unim-
plemented treaties can be made. As noted, not all human rights
treaty obligations depend on legislation for domestic effectiveness;
some can be performed by the executive through prerogative or
pre-existing statutory powers. For example, remedies could be pro-
vided in many areas of prisoners' rights guaranteed by treaty, par-
ticularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
by executive action authorized by the royal prerogative of mercy,
or by relevant statutory law.41 An action against the Crown for a
declaration of entitlement to protection, or in tort for failing to
provide it (or both together), is something that an enterprising
lawyer might consider. Even if an action to force the Crown to ex-
ercise its prerogative or statutory powers in a purely domestic con-
text would fail because of the discretionary nature of those pow-
ers,42 the added element of the international human rights treaty
undertaking to provide a remedy supplies the affirmative duty that
is otherwise absent.'3 There would be no overlapping of executive
41. In Forget v. Kaplan, No. T-1796-81 (Fed. Ct., Trial Div. March 31, 1981), it was
argued that both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights required the Solicitor-General of Canada, who has discretionary statutory
control over the matter, to permit inmates of federal penitentiaries in Quebec to vote in
provincial elections. The Solicitor-General refused, despite the existence of enabling Quebec
legislation, and the court refused to force him to grant the right to vote. Previously the
Solicitor-General had conceded that Canada was in breach of the Covenant obligation in
question (Justice & Legal Affairs Committee, July 15, 1980, 5:16). It appears that the plain-
tiff's argument based on the Declaration and Covenant was formulated more generally than
the argument suggested in the text.
In Van Dusen v. Canada, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/DR(XV)/R.12/50 (decision of April 23,
1982), the Human Rights Committee dealt with an individual petition alleging a violation of
article 15 of the Covenant by virtue of the failure of Canadian statutory law to accord the
benefit of a subsequently enacted lighter penalty to a certain class of individuals, The pre-
rogative of mercy could have been used to reduce the penalty, but the Minister refused to
exercise it for this purpose. Without deciding the merits of the case, the Committee found
the issue to be moot since the petitioner had been paroled by the time of its decision.
42. S. DE SMrrH, CONSMUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 116 (2d ed. 1973).
43. The general rule in the Anglo-Canadian system is that treaties are acts of state and
cannot be directly enforceable against the Crown (id. at 131). However, human rights trea-
ties are clearly intended to directly benefit individuals and thus differ from traditional in-
ternational law rights which belong only to the state (e.g., compensation received after the
successful pursuit of an international claim). There is judicial support for the proposition
that if the Crown makes it clear that it is acting to benefit an individual the general rule no
longer applies (Civilian War Claimants' Association Ltd. v. R., [1932] A.C. 14, 26-27 (H.L.)).
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and legislative roles. Nor is there any credible foreign policy inter-
ference concern of the type that, for example, has from time to
time arisen in "act of state" cases:"4 enforcing the rights of Canadi-
ans protected through a multilateral agreement is not going to em-
barrass our government in its foreign relations with any other
state. The real embarrassment lies in permitting the executive to
give with one hand by ratifying the treaty and take away with the
other by failing to implement it.
II. INDIRECT INCORPORATION: SUPPLEMENTING DOMESTIC LAW
Customary international law, unimplemented treaties, and
norms emanating from international intergovernmental agencies
can play a potentially significant role in supplementing ambiguous
domestic law or in justifying interpretations derived from domestic
sources. The common law, federal and provincial statutory law,
and the Constitution are all susceptible to interpretation illumi-
nated in this way by international human rights norms, in much
the same way as is American law." There is a common basis for a
resort to both custom and unimplemented treaties: the presump-
tion that the government does not intend to violate its interna-
tional obligations." In the absence of a clear signal to the contrary
by overriding domestic law, judges must give the domestic law a
This intention to benefit individuals is indicated clearly, for example, in article 2.2 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 5, which imposes an obligation on parties
to take "such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the. . . Covenant," and article 2.3 requires the provision of "an effective rem-
edy" as determined by "competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities." The
whole thrust of the Covenant and of other human rights instruments is to recognize rights
benefitting individuals and their entitlement to a remedy against the state, not just through
the state. It could be argued that the affirmative duty added by ratification can infuse the
legislative as well as the executive process, so that an action might lie against the executive
for failing to introduce legislation to correct domestic statutory law that contravenes the
Covenant. See generally, on the nature of these obligations, Editorial Comment-The Obli-
gation of the Parties to Give Effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 462 (1979).
44. See Part IIIA infra.
45. See generally Paust, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 227 (1981). The decision of
the court of appeals in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir.
1981) is an example of the use of international human rights instruments-the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the signed but unratified American Convention on
Human Rights-as aids in statutory and constitutional interpretation.
46. See Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1967] 2 Q.B. 116 (CA.).
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meaning in accordance with the customary or treaty norm.47
A recent authoritative formulation of this so-called "ambiguity
rule" is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Capi-
tal Cities case.' Three dissenting judges, all from Quebec, con-
cluded that there had been implementing legislation, but added
that in the absence of implementation a general grant of decision-
making power to the Canadian Radio and Television Commission
to regulate broadcasting should be interpreted in light of the spe-
cific terms of a treaty. Pigeon, J. stated:
... I cannot agree that the Commission may properly issue authorizations in
violation of Canada's treaty obligations. Its duty is to implement the policy
established by Parliament. While this policy makes no reference to Canada's
treaty obligations, it is an integral part of the national structure that external
affairs are the responsibility of the federal Government. It is an over-simplfi-
cation to say that treaties are of no legal effect unless implemented by
legislation. 9
After referring with approval to the adoption of the ambiguity rule
by English courts, Mr. Justice Pigeon went on to conclude that
"judicial notice ought to be taken that by virtue of the Convention
the appellants had a legal interest entitled to protection" which
the Commission could not interfere with.5°
The majority thought there was no implementation of the sort
perceived by the dissent and also was of the view, without disput-
ing the existence of the ambiguity rule but also without elaborating
on the issue, that there was no ambiguity to trigger recourse to the
treaty.5 1 The latter method of disposition is a frequent judicial re-
action, whatever the subject-matter of the treaty. Apart from the
47. With respect to custom, see Macdonald, supra note 13, at n.125. It is clear from
Reference re Offshore Mineral Rights, [1967] Can. S. Ct. 792, that international law can be
used for the purpose of constitutional interpretation.
48. Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 81
D.L.R.3d 609 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1977).
49. Id. at 641-42 (Pigeon, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 630-33. The majority also did not dispute the proposition that the ambiguity
rule can be used to control the exercise of administrative decision-making as well as the
interpretation of statutes and the common law. Where the executive has direct control of
the decision-making power, the situation is closer to one of direct incorporation (see text &
accompanying notes 41-43 supra); where the discretionary power of decision has been dele-
gated by statute to a subordinate agency such as the Commission in Capital Cities, the
situation more closely approximates indirect incorporation. See Duffy, supra note 14 at 597-
99; Ernewein v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, 103 D.L.R.3d 1, 17-18 (Sup. Ct.
Can. 1980) (Pigeon, J., dissenting).
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case of refugee status, which is special because at least the defini-
tion of refugee used in the legislation is the same as the treaty
definition,52 it is difficult to find examples where serious judicial
attention has been accorded to human rights treaties under the
ambiguity rule.
One reason for this judicial hesitancy is probably the reluc-
tance of the courts to interfere in a realm (treaty incorporation)
regarded as the pre~erve of the legislature. It should be noted that
this constitutional concern cannot apply to the use of customary
international law, but custom is in turn afflicted by the difficulty
domestic courts may have in determining what custom is in some
cases.5 Another reason for the relatively rare application of inter-
national human rights treaties is the fact that interest in the po-
tential of the ambiguity rule in the human rights area has been
stimulated by the recent ratification of the two Covenants, al-
though other treaties, notably the Charter and the Racial Discrimi-
nation Convention, were available prior to that time."
If the experience of British courts in dealing over a thirty year
period with the unimplemented European Convention of Human
Rights is any indication of what can be expected to happen in Ca-
nada to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the prognosis
is not optimistic. The cumulative result of a significant number of
cases, particularly in the decade of the 70's, has been, in the words
of the author of a recent study, that "in no case has this presump-
tion that Parliament does not intend to violate its obligations
under the Convention made any difference to the outcome."55 This
result has been reached by such judicial techniques as simplistic
52. The Immigration Act, CAN. STAT. c.52, s.2 (1976-77); the term "Convention refugee"
is used in the Act.
53. See text & accompanying notes 84 & 85 infra.
54. There are a few examples of the invocation of treaties to justify interpretations
derived from domestic sources in contexts where failure to apply the treaty norm would not
place Canada in violation of an international obligation. For instance, in R. v. Pasha &
Pasha, 61 C.C.C.2d 340 (1981), the Ontario Court of Appeal increased a prison sentence for
trafficking in cannabis because of, inter alia, "the international aspects of the trafficking
and Canada's obligation to deter the international distribution of narcotic drugs" (id. at
332). The "international obligation" arose from the 1961 Narcotic Drugs Convention, the
preamble to which the court quoted in full. See also R. v. Cossette-Trudel, [1979] Que.
C.S.P. 1039.
55. J. McBride, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights in the
United Kingdom 1951-81 3 (unpublished paper delivered at the annual conference of the
Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Halifax, June 1981).
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interpretation of the Convention, treating its provisions as too
vague to be of use, assuming that the common law is in compliance
with the Convention and expressing regrets in cases of conflict, and
regarding the Convention as a guideline for administrative deci-
sion-making in the immigration area only to later remove this
guiding effect.56
However, although the law is the same in Canada as it is in
Britain on this point, there are significant differences in context
that support the hypothesis that our courts may not react with the
same diffidence. First, the European Convention has a sophisti-
cated and effective international petition system that provides an
alternative to domestic enforcement; as previously indicated, the
same cannot be said of the Optional Protocol.
Second, Britain's membership in the European Economic
Community, which entails direct internal effect in British law of
certain E.E.C. decisions, has produced enough trauma for the doc-
trine of parliamentary supremacy that "unnecessary" inroads
might be expected to be resisted. Not only does Canada not have
anything similar to E.E.C. involvement, but the Canadian version
of legislative supremacy is bifurcated because Canada is a federal
state and is also uncertain as far as the relationship between do-
mestic and international law is concerned.57
Third, Canadian judges are influenced, perhaps increasingly,
by the more expansive American conception of the judicial role,
and there are promising American developments taking place in
this area.
Finally, the presence of a new, constitutionally entrenched
Charter of Rights in Canada will be conducive to the application of
international standards under the ambiguity rule, if for no other
reason than that its provisions will have to be interpreted. Further-
more, some sections of the Charter were clearly inspired by provi-
sions in international instruments, particularly the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Consequently, there can be
little doubt that international human rights law will be an impor-
tant interpretative source for the application of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.
There is also reason to be hopeful about future developments
56. Id.
57. See text & accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
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as a result of an increasing willingness on the part of courts to sup-
plement domestic law by referring to international law without be-
ing overly scrupulous about the international legal status of the
standard applied or its binding effect on Canada. This is not sur-
prising, for courts commonly transcend national boundaries in
search of wisdom. In the Canadian context, this point was made
well by McIntyre, J. in his dissent in the British Columbia Court
of Appeal in R. v. Miller and Cockriell, where he stated, in defence
of his use of decisions of American courts as guidelines to the
meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the old Bill
of Rights:
I am fully aware that American authority does not bind me and as I have said
it rests in part at least on a differing constitutional basis, but I have found it
helpful in seeking principles upon which this matter should be considered in
a civilized society. American references are not then made for the purpose of
citing legal authority. I consider and I refer to them in discussing the nature
of cruel and unusual punishment.58
If decisions of another country can provide wisdom in interpreting
domestic law, then at least the same value must be attributed to
the decisions of a sophisticated regional system which reflects the
bicultural legal system of Canada. Through this modality the Eu-
ropean Convention of Human Rights, which does not bind Canada,
can be used in the courts.59
Similarly, the consensus of the entire world community is no
less compelling as a source of authority than the decisions of for-
eign courts and non-binding treaties. In this way decisions of inter-
national agencies can have relevance in our courts although they
58. 63 D.L.R.3d 193, 257-58 (B.C. Ct. App. 1975).
59. In particular, interpretation of the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms (The Con-
stitution Act §§ 1-34) could be facilitated by using the European Convention. For example,
the general limitations clause in the Charter (id. at § 1) subjects the rights guaranteed "only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." This language is similar to limitations provisions contained in a num-
ber of international instruments, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the richest jurisprudence by far is
found in the decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European
Court of Human Rights interpreting parallel provisions of the European Convention. It is
this extensive practice, from a regional system composed of developed democratic states and
including civil and common law countries, that the Canadian Supreme Court is likely to find
most useful as guidance for interpreting § 1. See Higgins, Derogations Under Human
Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. YBK. INT'L L. 281 (1978).
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may be of dubious international legal status.6 0 In light of the con-
temporary proliferation of sets of international guidelines and
codes of conduct dealing not only directly with human rights but
with such related matters as safety standards and the conduct of
multinational corporations, the potential of this type of approach
is still virtually untapped. The likelihood of an international norm
being considered relevant will probably vary with the authorita-
tiveness of the norm and the degree of discretion accorded to the
judicial decision-maker by the domestic law. 1
III. THE POLICING FUNCTION: USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW TO OVERRIDE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC LAW
In view of the restrictions on the role of international law in
terms of its direct application and its supplementing function, it
might seem rather incongruous to conceive of it as ever playing the
role of overriding otherwise enforceable norms in the domestic le-
gal system. Yet it can perform this function in some circumstances
involving the application of foreign law and judgments as well as
domestic law.
60. One illustration is found in McCann v. Queen, 68 D.L.R.3d 661 (Fed. Ct., Trial Div.
1975), where the Federal Court declared that the confinement of the plaintiffs in the solitary
confinement unit of a penitentiary amounted to cruel and unusual punishment contrary to
the Canadian Bill of Rights. A psychiatrist whose testimony was relied on as persuasive by
the court had expressed the opinion that the conditions in the penitentiary did not comply
with the United Nations Minimum Standards for Prisoners. While the question of the legal
status of the Minimum Standards was not addressed by the court, it can hardly be denied
that they were in some way legally relevant, however small their independent contribution
to the outcome. Recent American cases have also invoked the U.N. Minimum Standards,
See Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611,
625 P.2d 123 (1981). A similar example is found in a recent U.S. decision in which the
International Labour Organization's Safety Code was used as the basis of expert testimony
relating to appropriate safety standards for a steel mill. In an action for negligence for faulty
design the court considered testimony based on the I.L.O. Code as relevant and appropriate
for submission to a jury. See George v. Morgan Construction Co., 389 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa.
1975), described in Chance, Codes of Conduct for Multi-national Corporations, 33 Bus.
LAW 1799, 1817-18 (1978).
61. For example, one might expect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by vir-
tue of its authoritative status, to be given more weight than a "declaration" or "code of
conduct" newly promulgated and more limited in scope of participation. It is interesting to
note that even when domestic courts use the U.D.H.R. as an aid to interpretation-the most
common use made of the U.D.H.R. by domestic courts-they rarely inquire into its legal
status. See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 59, 63; for a global survey see cases cited in id. at 59
n.68 and at 238 nn.13-20.
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A. International Law and the Conflict of Laws
Although Canadian courts are sensitive to the role of the legis-
lature in implementing treaties, the very same controlling constitu-
tional value which lies behind this form of deference-legislative
supremacy-has also probably been in large measure responsible
for our courts' unwillingness to defer as extensively to the role of
the executive in foreign affairs as have American courts. On the
other hand, any inroads that have been made in the doctrine of
legislative supremacy towards according constitutional status to
the functions of another branch of government have been in the
direction of protecting the judicial function. 2 The implications of
this legal situation are momentous.
One consequence of the separation of powers in the United
States has been the development of the political question doctrine
and such offshoots as the act of state doctrine. The latter insulates
actions taken by a foreign sovereign within its territory from scru-
tiny in American courts with respect to compliance with interna-
tional law because such inquiry is considered nonjusticiable.6 3 Al-
though the current U.S. political question doctrine is, to say the
least, chaotic in both theory and application and although it can be
argued persuasively that its basis is as much the prudential consid-
eration of protecting the executive from embarrassment in its con-
duct of foreign affairs as it is a constitutionally mandated judicial
abstention," there can be little doubt as to its consequences for
the impact of international law in American courts: it has facili-
tated the displacement of international law.65
The conventional wisdom in Canada is that there is no consti-
62. See, e.g., Attorney-General of Quebec v. Farrah, 86 D.L.R.3d 161 (Sup. Ct. Can.
1978); Crevier v. Attorney-General of Quebec, 127 D.L.R.3d 1 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1981).
63. On the political question doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); on act of
state, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Professor Gordon has
pointed out that although Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Sabbatino, does not
refer specifically to the political question doctrine, the "bulk of the Court's opinion in Sab-
batino-some nineteen separate references in all-is given over to showing why any ruling
by the Court on the issue before it could embarrass the executive in its conduct of foreign
relations" (with Baker cited as the source of this consideration). Gordon, American Courts,
International Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch upon Foreign Relations, 14
INT'L LAW 297, 312 (1980).
64. Schweitzer, The United Nations as a Source of Domestic Law: Can Security Coun-
cil Resolutions be Enforced in American Courts? 4 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
162, 174 (1979).
65. Gordon, supra note 63, at 306-07.
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tutionally protected executive function and, consequently, no for-
mal political question doctrine.6 7 Canadian constitutional lawyers
usually assume that the British position of the predominance of
the legislature is mirrored in Canada despite some evidence to the
contrary that should at least prompt further research." Of course,
the result of the development of a protected executive function
could well be the even further diminution of international law do-
mestically. In any event, it cannot be argued cogently that the lack
of a formal political question doctrine in Canada has no effect be-
cause the courts assume they have to defer to the executive in sen-
sitive areas. Not only do our courts follow their British counter-
parts in failing to see a constitutional basis for deference to the
executive, but their decisions often parallel those of British courts
in reflecting reluctance to refrain from applying international law
for such prudential reasons as not wanting to embarrass the execu-
tive in its conduct of foreign affairs or considering that the courts
are not functionally suited to making decisions which could have
sensitive foreign relations implications.6 9
The lack of a constitutional basis for the political question
concept augurs well for the future of international human rights
norms in Canada and other jurisdictions whose constitutions are
similar on this point. Although British courts have used only infre-
quently their discretion to refuse recognition to foreign acts of
state that violate international law or public policy,70 their general
66. P. HOGG, supra note 37, at 151, 200, 216-17.
67. Rankin, The Supreme Court of Canada and the International Uranium Cartel:
Gulf Oil and Canadian Sovereignty, 2 Sup. CT. L. Rav. 411, 428 (1981), quoting S. DE
SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 134 (2nd ed. 1973).
68. In the words of Hogg, the Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor Gen-
eral of Canada "could well be counted as part of Canada's Constitution." P. HOaaG, supra
note 37, at 5. Also, there is a separate Part III in the B.N.A. Act dealing with the powers of
the executive (§§ 9-16). And there is the related development toward a constitutionally pro-
tected judicial function (see generally cases cited note 62 supra) as well as the immunity
from legislative change of provisions in the B.N.A. Act providing for federal appointment of
judges and for their tenure. See P. HOGG, supra note 37, at 199. See generally Lyon, The
Central Fallacy of Canadian Constitutional Law, 22 McGILL L.J. 40 (1976).
69. For example, Canadian courts have always decided the scope of the immunity en-
joyed by a foreign sovereign from the jurisdiction of the courts (see cases cited note 14
supra) and have considered interrelated matters of treaty interpretation and duration to be
justiciable issues. See Chateau Gai Wines Ltd. v. Institut National des Appelations
D'Origine des Vins, 51 D.L.R.3d 120 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1975); compare Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
70. See generally on this controlling function of international law, Anglo-Iranian Oil
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competence to do so was affirmed recently by the House of Lords
in Oppenheimer v. Cattermole.71 The majority opinion stated, in
considering a Nazi decree that stripped Jews living outside Ger-
many of their citizenship and property, that "a law of this sort
constitutes so grave an infringement of human rights that the
courts of this country ought to refuse to recognize it as a law at
all. 17
2
Elsewhere in Europe courts have used the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, under the similar enabling concept of ordre
public, to deny recognition to foreign legislation which contravenes
its principles.73 One commentator has suggested that the concept
of ordre public international could be invoked to deny enforce-
ment of arrangements connected with the export of natural re-
sources from Namibia or with any attempt to impede the effective-
ness of international sanctions.7'
In one Canadian case the ordinary use was reversed: ratified
but unimplemented treaties were invoked as sources of public pol-
icy to defeat a claim that Dutch legislation was confiscatory and
should consequently not be enforced because it was contrary to Ca-
nadian public policy.75 It is important to stress that since contra-
ventions of either international law or public policy may qualify to
trigger these judicial "policing" activities,7 6 it may not even be nec-
essary to demonstrate the existence of a binding international
norm. 77
Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246; Re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] Ch. 323; Attorney-
General v. Nissan, [1970] A.C. 179 (H.L.); Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1975] 1 Q.B.
557; Oppenheimer v. Cattermole, [1975] 1 All E.R. 539 (H.L.).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 657.
73. Schreuer, The Impact of International Institutions on the Protection of Human
Rights in Domestic Courts, 4 Is. YBK. HUM. RTs. 60, 85 (1974).
74. Schreuer, The Relevance of United Nations Decisions in Domestic Litigation, 27
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 4 (1978).
75. Brown v. Beleggings Societat N.V., 29 D.L.R.2d 673 (Ont. H. Ct. 1961).
76. In Re Helbert Wagg, [1956] Ch. 323, 349, the court provided this formulation:
[T]he true limits of the principle that the courts of this country will afford rec-
ognition to legislation of foreign states in so far as it affects title to movables in
that state at the time of the legislation or contracts governed by the law of that
State rest on considerations of international law, or on the scarcely less difficult
considerations of public policy as understood in these courts.
77. In a 1972 German case a claim was made on an insurance policy covering the export
of cultural objects from Nigeria, contrary to that country's law. The Supreme Court decided
that it could not apply the Nigerian law, but because the export of the objects also violated
1981]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It should be emphasized, however, that this role of the courts
is discretionary and its exercise can be affected by such considera-
tions as risk of embarrassment to the executive in its conduct of
foreign affairs and the availability of "judicially discoverable and
manageable standards 7 8 for review. In the recent case of Buttes
Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer,9 the House of Lords, in an opinion
written by Lord Wilberforce, stated:
It is one thing to assert that effect will not be given to a foreign municipal
law or executive act if it is contrary to public policy, or to international law
[citing Re Helbert Wagg & Co., [1956] Ch. 323 and quite another to claim
that the courts may examine the validity, under international law, or some
doctrine of public policy, of an act or acts operating in the area of transac-
tions between states.80
The Court concluded that although the "constitutional posi-
tion and the relationship between the executive and the judiciary
in the United States is neither identical with our own nor in itself
constant,"81 there does exist in English law a "general principle
that the courts will not adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign
sovereign states. '8 2 This principle "for judicial restraint or absten-
tion," like the U.S. act of state doctrine, is "inherent in the very
nature of the judicial process."8 On the facts in Buttes, the Court
determined that deciding the issues raised would require it to eval-
uate competing claims of a number of states (not including Brit-
ain) in disputes about sovereignty over an island, the extent of ter-
ritorial waters, and a continental shelf boundary, as well as to
inquire into the motives for an act of one of the states. According
to the Court, such deliberations
are not issues upon which a municipal court can pass. Leaving aside all possi-
bility of embarrassment in our foreign relations (which it can be said not to
have been drawn to the attention of the court by the executive) there are...
no judicial or manageable standards by which to judge these issues ... the
court would be in a judicial no-man's land: the court would be asked to re-
view transactions in which four sovereign states were involved, which they
a Draft Convention and Resolutions adopted by UNESCO, declared the subject-matter of
the policy to be contrary to the ordre public international and hence unenforceable. See
Schreuer, supra note 74, at 3.
78. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
79. [1981] 3 W.L.R. 787.
80. Id. at 804.
81. Id. at 809.
82. Id. at 804.
83. Id.
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had brought to a precarious settlement, after diplomacy and the use of force,
and to say that at least part of these were "unlawful" under international
law.
8 4
In the result, the Court held these issues to be non-justiciable.
This judgment is replete with ambiguities, with the conse-
quence that its implications for judicial scrutiny of foreign acts in
human rights cases are uncertain. First, the scope of the Buttes
restraint doctrine is unclear. The emphasis placed on "transactions
between states" coupled with its application to the facts in Buttes
suggests that the doctrine is limited to foreign acts arising in the
context of the traditional purview of international law: regulating
interstate relations and disputes. On this reading there is no bar-
rier to scrutiny of foreign acts which violate human rights as long
as those acts concern only the relationship between the foreign
state and its own citizens. Indeed, it could even be argued that this
interpretation of Buttes results in strengthening the scrutinizing
role of domestic courts in human rights cases by removing the limi-
tations inherent in sensitivity to foreign relations implications and
the existence of clear standards.
However, other cases have made it clear that one factor in the
decision concerning recognition of a foreign act inimical to human
rights is the risk of embarrassing the executive in its conduct of
foreign relations, one of the criteria certainly not precluded by the
court in Buttes, if not emphasized.85 Moreover, if the threshold of
an "interstate transaction" is to be decisive in triggering the appli-
cation of the Buttes doctrine, serious classification problems arise.
It could be argued that the threshold is reached in a case where
what is in issue is the validity of a foreign act concerning only the
citizens of that state, because denial of recognition could result in
a dispute with the forum state. Such a low threshold would, how-
ever, render the test meaningless, for it would then be difficult to
identify what would not fall within "the area of transactions be-
tween states." Such a classification would include acts which are
84. Id. at 810.
85. See quote in text at id. With respect to discovering manageable standards, the diffi-
culties in judicial application of frequently uncertain interstate international law to complex
fact situations sometimes involving claims advanced by a number of states (as in Buttes)
will not ordinarily arise in human rights cases. The latter are commonly substantively famil-
iar to scrutinizing judges as a result of their own experience in dealing with similar subject
matter in applying domestic law.
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not "act[s] . .. operating in the area of transactions between
states."'86 Beyond this point, one is left with no guidelines to deter-
mine when the threshold has been reached: If the foreign act af-
fects a citizen of the forum state? A third state?
Furthermore, if all or some human rights cases are subject to
the restraint doctrine, does this mean that the foreign acts in-
volved are totally insulated from scrutiny or that each case must
be assessed on its merits on the basis of such factors as foreign
relations risk and the existence of judicially applicable standards
of review? In other words, did the court in Buttes describe the le-
gal issues in the case as raising non-justiciable issues for the pur-
pose of demonstrating why all transactional cases should be ex-
empt from review or did it do so for the purpose of deciding this
case only and with the intention of evaluating each case for com-
pliance with the criteria of justiciability? The latter approach
makes much more sense, for the difficulty of both discovering and
applying standards, and the relevance of the embarrassment factor
will vary considerably from case to case. But the Buttes court is
unclear about this, and it is simply not possible at this time to
assess how far Buttes has moved British law in the direction of the
U.S. act of state doctrine. In any event, it is impossible to predict
whether Canadian courts are likely to follow the British lead. In
view of the difficulty of ascertaining where British law is going on
this point, there is reason to suspect hesitation.
B. International Law and Public Policy
The second area involving the use of international norms to
override otherwise enforceable domestic law differs from that just
considered in that the impugned acts are domestic and not foreign.
Under common law doctrine, public policy may serve as a basis for
decision in a wide variety of cases not regulated by statute, notably
to control private law-making consisting of such instruments as
contracts, restrictive covenants, and wills. If statutes and common
law principles can be a source of public policy, there is no reason
why similarly objective standards of customary and treaty law and
the consensus resolutions and guidelines of international agencies
should not serve the same purpose. A state can play a role in the
formation of all of these norms, which to that extent are clearly
86. See text & accompanying note 80 supra.
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expressions of national as well as world community policy.8 7 In the
famous case of Drummond Wren, Mackay, J. of the Ontario High
Court invoked the human rights provisions of the United Nations
Charter to strike down an anti-semitic restrictive covenant.8  The
common law rule against covenants contrary to public policy pro-
vided the triggering mechanism for recourse to international in-
struments which, in combination with the more traditional domes-
tic sources, helped in defining the content of that policy. This
approach was not followed in the subsequent case of Noble &
Wolf, where Schroeder, J. viewed the use of the Charter in defining
public policy as an attempt to circumvent the role of the legisla-
ture in implementing international commitments. 9 This criticism
cannot, of course, apply to customary law. Furthermore, it is not a
valid criticism, for the basis for decision is not the direct applica-
tion of a treaty but rather the application of a domestic public pol-
icy norm-the treaty simply helps to define its content.
Schroeder, J.'s primary objection affected the domestic sources
as much as the international and concerned the role of the judge in
applying public policy. Judges who regard this concept as an "un-
ruly horse" capable of causing all sorts of damage typically take
the position that the boundaries of public policy should not be ex-
tended. This tension between judicial conservatism and liberalism,
well illustrated in a comparison of the decisions of the Ontario trial
and appeal courts in the case of Stephens v. Gulf Oil,9 will always
be present and much will depend on getting before a "liberal"
judge, or even a "conservative" who is prepared to recognize that
the sources and content of public policy change over time though
the boundaries must remain constant. There is at least an even
chance that our courts will follow a recent decision of the House of
Lords, in which it was stated that "conceptions of public policy
should move with the times and. . widely accepted treaties and
statutes may point the direction in which such conceptions, as ap-
plied by the courts, ought to move."9 1
87. This is particularly true of treaties: a ratified treaty is obviously an expression of
national policy; if it has received Parliamentary approval, it is also an expression of legisla-
tive policy.
88. Re Drummond Wren, [1945] O.R. 778 (H. Ct.).
89. Re Noble & Wolf, [1948] O.R. 579, 592 (H. Ct.).
90. Stephens v. Gulf Oil Canada Ltd., 3 O.R.2d 241 (H. Ct. 1974); 11 O.R.2d 129 (Ct.
App. 1976).




There exists great scope in law for the integration of interna-
tional human rights law into the domestic legal system of Canada,
but the instances of its application have so far been relatively few.
One reason for this disappointing outcome is that judges and law-
yers are not well-equipped to meet the challenge. Judges are often
unsure or simply wrong in their understanding of international
law."2 Even judges who have a firm grasp of the substance of inter-
national law may be inclined to view it as a legal system properly
concerned only with relations between states and consequently to
assume that international issues should be more appropriately
treated as political questions to be decided by the executive or the
legislature, although the same judges may not hesitate to become
involved in purely domestic "political" issues.9 3 Interestingly, there
is some evidence to suggest that judges of the civil law Quebec sys-
tem may be doing better than their common law counterparts in
handling international law issues.9
The quality of judicial treatment of international law depends
to a large extent on the sophistication of lawyers' arguments, and
despite some signs of improvement it is clear that lawyers accus-
tomed to working in a domestic legal world too often do little to
demonstrate the relevance of international law. Since legal educa-
tion begins in the law schools, international law teachers must
share part of the blame for the failure in training. International
law is usually taught as an upper year option in North American
law schools, and it is typically studied by no more than twenty-five
per cent of law students. Furthermore, it is still often taught in a
way that emphasizes its separateness from, instead of its relation-
92. See note 26 supra.
93. See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 6; Gordon, supra note 63, at 311-13. A healthy
scepticism about the distinction between "political questions and legal questions" has been
expressed by Myres McDougal: "In my country, the difference between political and legal is
simply: when the question is so hot, and the Supreme Court does not have the guts to
handle it, it calls it political and heads for the door. . . . [O]n the international level, the
difference is that it is political when a state is unwilling to submit a dispute to the processes
of law; it is legal when a state is willing to submit it to the processes of law." McDougal, 1
CANADA-U.S. L.J. 32 (1978).
94. See, e.g., the dissenting opinions of the Quebec judges in the Supreme Court deci-
sions in Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television Commission, 81
D.L.R.3d 609 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1977) and Ernewein v. Minister of Employment & Immigration,
103 D.L.R.3d 1 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1980).
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ship to, domestic law: as a "perspective" course, transcending the
rough and tumble of domestic law, both mystical and pristine in
scope and conception if flawed in application. An integrative focus
would provide not only a more realistic course but would also very
likely increase the percentage of students taking it. 5 International
law professors can also do a better selling job on their colleagues,
by convincing teachers of such courses as criminal law, constitu-
tional law, and civil liberties of the value of incorporating an inter-
national legal component. Further, they should encourage the es-
tablishment of appropriate clinical programs in law schools,9 as
well as of continuing legal education programs for both lawyers
and judges.
Even where the mental tools are present the physical supports
may be lacking. Easy access to international law materials by law-
yers and judges is frequently not available. In the first place, Cana-
dian court decisions dealing with international law are not well-
indexed, with the result that its more subtle and tangential uses
are not discoverable through ordinary research methods.9 7 On an-
other level, physical access to the raw material of international law
is often unavailable. For example, interpreting a treaty involves
much more than perusing a text; a plethora of committee and com-
mission discussions, reports, recommendations, and decisions, com-
prising both the travaux preparatoires and authoritative interpre-
tations, is an important part of the interpretive process.98 Much of
this information is available only in sophisticated libraries or, in
some cases, only from international agencies. This problem is cer-
tainly not unique to Canada; it has been described by one com-
mentator as the most important reason for the limited impact on
95. An impressionistic survey indicates that in comparison with their U.S. counterparts
a higher proportion of Canadian law schools offer courses in international human rights law.
The ratio is particularly impressive for Ontario, where in any given year three or four of the
six law schools teach such courses.
96. The international human rights law clinic program at the State University of New
York at Buffalo is a pioneering effort in this area.
97. For instance, the contributory value of the U.N. Minimum Standards in McCann v.
Queen, 68 D.L.R.3d 661 (Fed. Ct., Trial Div. 1975), is discoverable only after a careful read-
ing of the decision. There are no guideposts to reference to the Standards in any of the
research tools.
98. For example, a commentator on the Alberta Union case has suggested that a crucial
decision of an I.L.O. Commission of Inquiry, which favored the union's position that there
had been a violation of a treaty, was apparently not brought to the attention of Sinclair, C.J.
See Bendel, supra note 24, at 185.
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domestic law of the decisions of agencies set up under the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights.9 9 Unless more is done to re-
move training and access barriers, the great potential which exists
in Canadian law for the domestic integration of international
human rights norms, so recently emphasized in the American con-
text by cases such as Filartiga and Fernandez, will never be fully
realized.
99. See Schreuer, supra note 73.
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